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I. INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him
... "I The United States Supreme Court has held that this right
includes the right of the accused to cross-examine witnesses testifying
against him.2 A difficult situation arises, however, when one codefend-
ant3 makes a pretrial confession, inculpating not only himself but also
another defendant, after the other defendant has also made a confession
that interlocks4 with the codefendant's confession. The difficulty arises
when the prosecution attempts to admit the codefendant's confession
after the codefendant asserts his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination at the joint trial of the codefendant 5 and defendant. 6
The United States Supreme Court has utilized a two-tier analysis
for determining whether the codefendant's confession is admissible in
its entirety at the joint trial. First, a trial court should determine whether
the codefendant's confession is substantively admissible against the
defendant without violating the Confrontation Clause, which requires
I. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
3. The term "codefendant" refers to the individual whose out-of-court confession inculpates
himself and another defendant and is admitted in their joint trial.
4. The term "interlock" indicates that the codefendant and defendant's confessions contain
some, or all, of the same facts.
5. Although a codefendant's confession constitutes hearsay, it is exempted from the hearsay
rules and is admissible against the codefendant as an admission of a party-opponent under FED. R.
EvID. 801(d)(2).
6. If the codefendant testifies as a witness at trial and is subject to full cross-examination,
admission of his out-of court confession does not violate the Confrontation Clause. California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970).
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the confession both to qualify as a hearsay7 exception with respect to the
defendant and comply with the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause. Many courts have erroneously presumed, however, that as long
as the confessions do not offend the Confrontation Clause, then the
courts need not address the hearsay issue separately. This erroneous
presumption stems from the misinterpretation by the trial courts of the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding interlocking confessions, Lee v.
Illinois9 and Cruz v. New York. 10 Second, if a court determines that
substantive use of the codefendant's confession against the defendant is
not constitutionally permitted, the court then must comply with the.
requirements mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Bruton v.
United States.I
II. SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSIBILITY OF A CODEFENDANT'S CONFESSION
A. The Hearsay Requirement
The hearsay exception that often permits the admission of the con-
fession of a codefendant against the defendant is the exception for state-
ments made by the declarant which were against his interest at the time
he made them. This exception is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) and in many state evidence codes.12 The utilization of this
exception in the context of confessions made by a codefendant while in
the custody of police poses several unsettling issues affecting admissibil-
ity. The first issue that divides courts is whether a confession given by a
codefendant while in custody was in fact "against interest," such that a
reasonable person would not have made the statement unless he believed
it to be true.' 3 In Lee v. Illinois,4 without specifically addressing the
7. Hearsay is an out of court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter
asserted therein. FED. R. Ev. 801(c).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
10. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
11. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
12. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) provides a hearsay exception for:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
13. Many state courts also recognize an exception for statements against interest,
implemented by statute or common law. See, e.g., CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1230 (West 1992);
FLA. STAT. ch. 9.804 (1991); see also New York v. Brensic, 509 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1987).
14. 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986).
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requirements for this hearsay exception, the United States Supreme
Court emphasized that "a codefendant's confession is presumptively
unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant's conduct or culpa-
bility because those passages may well be the product of the codefend-
ant's desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or
divert attention to another."' 5 The Court recognized that a codefendant
may overstate another defendant's involvement in retaliation for his hav-
ing implicated the codefendant in his confession.16 The Court noted that
"once partners in crime recognize that the 'jig is up,' they ... immedi-
ately become antagonists, rather than accomplices."' 7
The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 804(b)(3) adopts a similar
approach, stating that the determination of whether or not a statement
was in fact against the declarant's interest must be determined from the
circumstances of each case. 18  The note suggests that a "statement
admitting guilt and implicating another person, made while in custody,
'may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and
hence fail to qualify as against interest."' 9 Both federal and state courts
follow the aforementioned guidelines when determining whether a
declarant's statement was sufficiently against his interest. These courts
scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement,
the content of the statement, and possible motivations behind making the
statement, while recognizing the possibility of a desire to curry favor.2°
Some courts seem to require obvious evidence of a motivation to falsify,
15. Id. at 545.
16. Id. at 544.
17. Id. at 544-45.
18. FED. R. EvID. 804 advisory committee's note.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Magana-Olvera, 917 F.2d 401, 409 (9th Cir. 1990).
Neither party disputes that Ricky's remarks tended to subject him to criminal
liability. However, they hotly dispute ... whether a reasonable person in Ricky's
shoes would not have made the statements unless true ....
Under the prevailing view then, Ricky's statements were not sufficiently
against his interest because: (1) they were made under custody; (2) they were made
in an attempt to curry favor from the federal authorities; (3) the government
encouraged his cooperation by suggesting that it could cut his prison time in half if
he cooperated; and (4) the statements trivialized Ricky's role in the drug conspiracy
by pointing to Magana as the "kingpin."
Id. at 407, 409; United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 837 (3d Cir. 1988) ("While we are unwill-
ing to hold that any declaration against interest made in custody is inherently unreliable, an exami-
nation of the 'totality of circumstances' in this case does not support the conclusion that
McMahon's statement is trustworthy."); People v. Frierson, 808 P.2d 1197, 1205 (Cal. 1991) (en
banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 944 (1992) ("In determining whether a statement is truly against
interest.., the court may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under which
they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant's relationship to the
defendant.").
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while other courts employ less stringent standards for ascertaining
whether the declarant may have falsified his statement.2
The second issue that courts and commentators debate concerns
whether collateral inculpatory statements contained within the codefend-
ant's confession are admissible against the defendant, or whether only
noncollateral inculpatory statements are admissible against him. 22
McCormick summarizes three approaches for determining the admissi-
bility of a declaration containing both statements against interest and
collateral statements.23 Commentators and federal and state judges disa-
gree as to which of these three approaches best adjusts the admissibility
of the statement to the trustworthiness of its parts. Thus, courts have
adopted all of these approaches.
The first approach is to admit the entire declaration under the rea-
soning that because part of the statement is disserving, then by a conta-
gion of truthfulness, the entire statement will be trustworthy. 24 The
second approach "compare[s] the strength of the self-serving interest
21. Compare United States v. Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536, 1540-41 (11th Cir. 1991) (requiring an
obvious motive to falsify) and United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1421 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding the record lacked evidence of motivating factors because the declarant made statements
voluntarily and not as part of a plea arrangement) with United States v. Monaco, 735 F.2d 1173,
1176-77 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that courts consistently hold that certain circumstances
surrounding statements made while in police custody render such statements unreliable) and
United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (recognizing it is common for
arrestees to try to curry favor with law enforcement officials).
22. In a collateral inculpatory declaration, the inculpatory material is not found in the portion
of the statement directly against the declarant's interest, but appears instead in another portion of
the statement. In contrast, in a noncollateral inculpatory statement, the facts inculpating the
defendant are found in the portion of the statement directly against the declarant's interest.
Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpating Statements Against Penal
Interest, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1197 n.7 (1978).
An inculpatory statement is one which implicates both the declarant and the defendant in
criminal activity and which is admitted against the defendant. In contrast, an exculpatory
statement is a declaration against the declarant's interest which indicates that the defendant is not
responsible for the crime charged. Id.
23. McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 279 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d
ed. 1972).
24. Id. at 677. See, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1171 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990) ("In admitting a statement as against the penal interest of the
declarant, the district court need not excise those portions which refer to others.... Admitting the
entire statement even though it contains a reference to others is particularly appropriate when that
reference is closely connected to the reference to the declarant."); United States v. Lieberman, 637
F.2d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Even if [the statement] were wholly neutral, however, it could
constitute a statement against interest within the meaning of Rule 804(b)(3) since it was part and
parcel of a larger conversation in which clearly self-incriminating statements were made ....");
see also New Mexico v. Earnest, 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987); North Carolina v. Wilson, 367
S.E.2d 589, 598-99 (N.C. 1988) ("Rather, we adopt the view ... that such collateral statements
are admissible even though they are themselves neutral as to the declarant's interest if they are
integral to a larger statement which is against the declarant's interest.").
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and the disserving interest in making the statement as a whole. '2 5 When
a disserving interest predominates, courts admit the entire statement;
courts exclude the entire statement if the self-serving interest predomi-
nates.26 The third approach "admit[s] the disserving parts of the declara-
tion, and exclude[s] the self-serving parts."27
Under the third approach, however, some courts will allow the
admission of the self-serving parts if there are reasonable assurances of
trustworthiness based both on the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the making of the statement, and on whether the declarant had a
motive to lie. 28  Although McCormick views the third approach as "the
most realistic method of adjusting admissibility to trustworthiness,"2 9
Wigmore prefers the first alternative because the declarant made the
statement while he was in the "trustworthy condition of mind which
permitted him to state what was against his interest."30 Additionally,
some courts require corroborating evidence before permitting the intro-
duction of inculpatory statements under this rule.3
25. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 677.
26. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 677 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Washington v. Rice, 844
P.2d 416, 424 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) ("The overall circumstances surrounding McNeil's letter do
not suggest the statements were self-serving. The statement made to Detective Shaw during
police interrogation deserves greater scrutiny, because it was precisely the context in which one
co-defendant might attempt to shift blame onto another. McNeil's statement, however, did not
'assign a minor role' to himself and 'a major role' to Rice.... Therefore, McNeil's statements are
admissible under the Rules of Evidence.").
27. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 677 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Stephens, Inc. v.
Geldermann, Inc., 962 F.2d 808, 812 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Any portion of a statement not against
interest must be edited out or the whole statement is inadmissible.") (citing United States v. Lilley,
581 F.2d 182, 188 (8th Cir. 1978)); United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 883 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) ("Thus, to the extent that a statement not against the declarant's
interest is severable from other statements satisfying 804(b)(3) ... such statement should be
excluded.") (citation omitted); United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 188 (8th Cir. 1978).
The restriction advocated by McCormick excluding portions of statements which
are not against the declarant's interest is in keeping with the reasoning behind the
804(b)(3) exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 804(b)(3) is based on the guaranty of
trustworthiness which accompanies a statement against interest. To the extent that a
statement is not against the declarant's interest, the guaranty of trustworthiness does
not exist and that portion of the statement should be excluded.
Id.; see also New York v. Brensic, 509 N.E.2d 1226, 1229 (N.Y. 1987) ("[lIt should admit only
the portion of that statement which is opposed to the declarant's interest since the guarantee of
reliability contained in declarations against penal interest exists only to the extent the statement is
disserving to the declarant."); People v. Leach, 541 P.2d 296, 311 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 926 (1976) (en banc) ("[W]e construe the exception to the hearsay rule ... to be inapplicable
to evidence of any statement or portion of a statement not itself specifically disserving to the
interests of the declarant.") ( footnote omitted).
28. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Kiewert, 605 A.2d 1031, 1036 (N.H. 1992).
29. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 677.
30. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1465, at 341 (Chadbourn
rev. 1974).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Moreover, courts may permit the admission of the codefendant's
confession under a residual hearsay exception if the applicable rules of
evidence provide such an exception.3 2 For example, the Federal Rules
of Evidence provide an exception to the hearsay rules for "[a] statement
not specifically covered by any of the [other] exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 33
B. The Confrontation Clause Requirements
If the confession is admissible against the defendant under a hear-
say exception, the court must determine whether admitting the confes-
sion violates the Confrontation Clause as construed in Ohio v. Roberts34
and its progeny. With respect to a statement admitted under a hearsay
exception, when the declarant was not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Court in Roberts required the fulfillment of a two-prong test.35
First, in general, the declarant must have been unavailable.36 Second,
his statement must bear adequate "indicia of reliability. ' 37 Courts could
infer reliability, without more, where the evidence fell under a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception. 8 In cases where the evidence did not fall
within a "firmly rooted" exception, the evidence had to be excluded
absent a showing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."39
The Supreme Court limited the impact of the requirements it
announced in Roberts in its decisions in several subsequent cases. With
respect to the first prong of the Roberts test, in United States v. Inadi,4 °
the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that Ohio established a rule
that out-of-court statements were not admissible without a showing of
unavailability.4" The Court clarified the scope of the Roberts test, in
White v. Illinois,42 by interpreting Roberts as standing for "the proposi-
tion that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation
Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were
made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding."43 In view of Inadi
Harrell, 788 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11 th Cir. 1986); United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir.
1980).
32. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970).
33. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
34. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
35. Id. at 66.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
41. Id. at 400.
42. 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992).
43. Id. at 741.
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and White, the Roberts test does not require a declarant to be unavailable
in order for a co-conspirator's statement to be admitted," . or in order for
the evidence to be admitted under the exceptions for "spontaneous dec-
larations and statements made for medical treatment."45 Although the
Court has not specifically held that unavailability is not required in order
for courts to admit evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)
without violating the Confrontation Clause, the reasoning utilized by the
Court in the aforementioned cases could easily suggest such a conclu-
sion. The Court's assertion that unavailability was not required in the
previous cases rested on several factors: (1) the evidentiary value of
such statements; 46 (2) their reliability;47 and, (3) the fact "that establish-
ing a generally applicable unavailability rule would have few practical
benefits while imposing pointless litigation costs.48
The Court's decisions concerning which hearsay exceptions qualify
as "firmly rooted" exceptions also weakened the impact of Roberts as
the Court qualified an exception on the basis of its long-standing tradi-
tion, rather than on an assessment of its reliability.49 The Court
strengthened the proposition that an exception should qualify as "firmly
rooted" based on its reliability, because "[a]dmission under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of relia-
bility because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legisla-
tive experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-
of-court statements. 50
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the 804(b)(3) excep-
tion for declarations against penal interest is a "firmly rooted" exception
44. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
45. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 742. The White Court noted that "a statement that qualifies for admission under a
'firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add
little to its reliability." Id. at 743. The very fact that these statements provide substantial
guarantees of their trustworthiness has led the Court "to conclude that 'firmly rooted' exceptions
carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the
Confrontation Clause." Id. at 742 n.8. The effect, the Court relied on the second-prong of the
Ohio test to declare that the first-prong of the test is unnecessary.
48. Id. at 742.
49. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (holding that the co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is "firmly rooted" because the Court had established it
over a century and a half ago and since reaffirmed). The Bourjaily Court ignored the fact that the
coconspirator hearsay exception is commonly supported on the basis of agency and the adversarial
system, rather than on reliability.
50. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990); see also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 552
(1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[S]tatements squarely within established hearsay exceptions
possess 'the imprimatur of judicial and legislative experience' . . . and that fact must weigh
heavily in our assessment of their reliability for constitutional purposes.") (citation omitted).
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and thus presumptively reliable for confrontation clause purposes.
Several federal courts of appeal have expressly reserved the question
without deciding it.52 Although four of the justices in Lee v. Illinois did
issue an opinion finding that 804(b)(3) was "firmly rooted," 53 the major-
ity rejected the categorization of the hearsay involved in that case as a
"declaration against penal interest."'54 Instead the majority decided the
case as if it involved "a confession by an accomplice which incriminates
a criminal defendant."55 Thus, because the codefendant's confession did
not fall within a "firmly rooted" exception, the Court instead examined
whether sufficient independent "indicia of reliability" existed to over-
come the presumption of unreliability. Specifically, the Court addressed
the question of whether the interlocking character of the defendant and
codefendant's confessions may provide the requisite reliability.56
In Lee, the codefendant and the defendant both confessed to police
regarding their respective roles in two murders after being brought into
custody for questioning. 57 Although the confessions overlapped greatly
in their factual recitations, they diverged most significantly with respect
to factual circumstances relevant to determining whether the murders
had been premeditated.5" In rejecting the defendant's assertions that she
had acted either in self-defense or under intense or sudden passion, the
trial judge expressly relied on the codefendant's confession and version
of the killings.59
The Court reiterated the Roberts requirements necessary to satisfy
the Confrontation Clause with respect to the admission of a codefend-
ant's confession: "even if certain hearsay evidence does not fall within
'a firmly rooted hearsay exception' and is thus presumptively unreliable
... it may nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause reliability standards if
51. United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1405 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1046 (1989).
52. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Monaco, 735 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1984).
53. 476 U.S. at 551-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 544 n.5.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 532.
58. Most significantly, Thomas stated that he and Lee had previously discussed killing
Aunt Beedie, and referred to conversations immediately prior to the murders that
suggested a premeditated plan to kill....
Lee's statement, by contrast, suggested that it was Thomas who had been
provoked by Aunt Beedie's behavior and Thomas who had snapped the night of the
murders. Her statement made no mention of an alleged decision by herself and
Thomas to "go through with it," nor, of course, did it indicate that the two had
formulated a plan ....
Id. at 538.
59. Id. at 538.
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it is supported by a 'showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.' "I The Court, however, also emphasized that "the [Confronta-
tion] Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such
trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason
[underlying the existence of the Confrontation Clause].' "61
In applying this standard to determine whether the facts in Lee sat-
isfied the Confrontation Clause, the Court found that the circumstances
surrounding the codefendant's confession did not rebut the presumption
that the codefendant's statement was unreliable regarding the defend-
ant's participation in the murders.62 The Court found that a codefend-
ant's confession was not necessarily rendered reliable simply because
some of the facts it contained "interlocked" with the facts of the defend-
ant's confession.63 Therefore, "[i]f those portions of the codefendant's
purportedly 'interlocking' statement which bear to any significant
degree on the defendant's participation in the crime are not thoroughly
substantiated by the defendant's own confession, the admission of the
statement" would violate the Confrontation Clause. 6' The Court's lan-
guage supports the conclusion that if the defendant's and codefendant's
confessions are identical in all material respects, the interlocking nature
of the confessions may provide the required reliability.
The Supreme Court, in Cruz v. New York,65 subsequently clarified
what role the "interlocking" nature of a codefendant's and defendant's
confessions is to play in determining the constitutional admissibility of
the codefendant's confession. The Court stated that the interlocking
nature of the codefendant's confession pertains to its reliability, not its
"harmfulness."66 Therefore, its reliability may be relevant in determin-
ing whether the confession should be admitted as evidence against the
60. Id. at 543 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
61. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)).
62. When [the codefendant] was taken in for questioning and read his rights he refused
to talk to the police. The confession was elicited only after [the codefendant] was
told that [the defendant] had already implicated him and only after he was implored
by [the defendant] to share 'the rap' with her. The unsworn statement was given in
response to the questions of police, who, having already interrogated [the
defendant], no doubt knew what they were looking for, and the statement was not
tested in any manner by contemporaneous cross-examination by counsel .... It is
worth noting that the record indicates that [the codefendant] not only had a
theoretical motive to distort the facts to [the defendant's] detriment, but that he also
was actively considering the possibility of becoming her adversary: prior to trial,
[the codefendant] contemplated becoming a witness for the State against [the
defendant].
Id. at 544.
63. Id. at 545.
64. Id.
65. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
66. Id. at 192.
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defendant.67 Assuming the confession cannot be admitted, the interlock-
ing nature is not relevant to determining whether the "jury is likely to
obey the instruction to disregard it, or [whether] the jury's failure to
obey is likely to be inconsequential."68 Thus, the Court affirmed the Lee
holding that courts could consider the defendant's interlocking confes-
sion in assessing whether the codefendant's statements are supported by
sufficient 'indicia of reliability' to be substantively admissible as evi-
dence against him without violating the Confrontation Clause.6 9
C. Misapplication of Lee v. Illinois
It is important to note that Lee and Cruz do not support the notion
that as long as a statement bears independent "indicia of reliability" suf-
ficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause requirements, then the state-
ment is admissible as substantive evidence against the defendant even if
it does not meet the requirements of a hearsay exception. Many courts
have interpreted Lee in such a manner. These courts either completely
refrain from addressing whether the confession would be admissible
under a hearsay exception, instead focusing solely on the Confrontation
Clause requirements, 70 or note that a hearsay problem exists, but con-
clude that the confession is either admissible or inadmissible based on
the Confrontation Clause requirements set out in Lee.7 This type of
analysis is entirely incorrect.72
In determining what precedential impact the Court intended for its
Lee decision, it is important to note that the Lee Court stated that the
question presented to them was " 'whether that substantive use of the
[codefendant's] hearsay confession denied [defendant's] rights guaran-
teed ... under the Confrontation Clause .... ,,73 The Court specifically
noted that the admissibility of the evidence as a matter of state law was
not at issue in the case.74 In addition, the Supreme Court has held in
prior cases that although the "hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause
67. Id. at 192-93.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 193.
70. See, e.g., Illinois v. Sevier, 598 N.E.2d 968, 974-76 (11. App. Ct. 1992); Illinois v. Parks,
523 N.E.2d 130 (I11. App. Ct. 1988); New Mexico v. Gallegos, 781 P.2d 783 (N.M. Ct. App.
1989).
71. 476 U.S. 530 (1986): see, e.g., U.S. v. Vernor, 902 F.2d 1182, 1186-88 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 92 (1990); Whack v. Maryland, 615 A.2d 1226, 1233-34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992), cert. denied, 622 A.2d 1196 (Md. 1993); Illinois v. MacFarland, 592 N.E.2d 471, 479-81
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Illinois v. Lincoln, 510 N.E.2d 1026, 1029-31 (I11. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
515 N.E.2d 120 (Ill. 1987).
72. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
73. 476 U.S. at 539 (quoting Respondent's Brief at 11).
74. Id.
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are generally designed to protect similar values."75 and "stem from the
same roots,"76 the Supreme Court has been careful "not to equate the
Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the
admission of hearsay statements."77 A codefendant's confession, there-
fore, must fulfill the requirements of both the hearsay rules and the Con-
frontation Clause before a court may substantively admit it against the
defendant that it inculpates.78
A literal reading of the Court's interpretation of Lee in Cruz may be
misleading because the Court stated in Cruz that the interlocking nature
of the codefendant and defendant's confessions may be relevant to
"whether the confession should (despite the lack of opportunity for
cross-examination) be admitted as evidence against the defendant. 79
The Court merely referred to whether substantive use of the codefend-
ant's confession against the defendant is constitutionally permissible. In
other words, the Court is trying to determine whether the interlocking
nature of the two confessions provides adequate indicia of reliability to
fulfill the requirements of Roberts. The Court used the phrase "admitted
as evidence" to emphasize that the interlocking nature of the confessions
is relevant to whether the confession is substantively admissible against
the defendant without violating the Confrontation Clause, as opposed to
being relevant where the court determines that the confession is constitu-
tionally inadmissible against the defendant because the requirements of
Roberts have not been fulfilled.
The Illinois Appellate Court decision in Illinois v. Moore illustrates
the correct relationship between the hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause.8" The Moore court declared that "Lee recognized that even if
the confession meets the 'Lee test' for admissibility under the sixth
amendment analysis, State hearsay rules could act independently of the
confrontation clause to preclude admission of codefendants' reliable
confessions."81 The court further found that "the fact that a confession
is interlocking under Lee does not render the confession admissible
under Illinois evidentiary analysis." 2 Other courts also have correctly
addressed the hearsay requirements and Confrontation Clause require-
ments individually.8 3
75. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
76. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
77. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-15 (1990).
78. See, Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1987).
79. Id. at 193.
80. 593 N.E.2d 771 (I11. App. Ct. 1992).
81. Id. at 778 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 778-79.
83. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Cook, 610 A.2d 800 (N.H. 1992); Illinois v. Moman, 558
N.E.2d 1231 (Ill.App. I Dist. 1990); Washington v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1993).
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The confusion that courts confront probably stemmed from the
requirements of the residual hearsay exception under the Federal Rules
of Evidence 803(24). Rule 803(24) requires that the evidence have cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the other hearsay
exceptions. These requirements are similar to the particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness mandated by the Lee decision. It is crucial for
the courts to determine whether a hearsay exception has been met, how-
ever, because some states do not provide a residual hearsay exception. 4
Additionally, the residual hearsay exception for the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires affording separate notice to the adverse party. 5
III. THE BRuTON PROBLEM
If the codefendant's confession is constitutionally inadmissible
against the defendant because the requirements of Roberts have not been
fulfilled, then current law clearly dictates that the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Bruton v. United States86 is applicable. Prior to Bruton, the gen-
eral rule was that admission of one codefendant's pretrial confession
implicating another defendant, where two or more defendants were
being tried jointly, would violate the Confrontation Clause unless the
confessing defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right not to testify,
thus permitting cross-examination." "Ordinarily, [however,] a witness
is considered to be a witness 'against' a defendant for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause only if his testimony is part of the body of evi-
dence that the jury may consider in assessing [the defendant's] guilt."88
Therefore, a witness whose testimony is introduced into evidence with
the limiting instruction that it be used only to assess the guilt of the
codefendant would not be considered as a witness "against" the defend-
ant, and the Confrontation Clause protection would not be invoked.89
This rule assumes that jurors actually follow a court's limiting jury
instructions.90 The Court recognized a narrow exception to this in
Bruton, where it held that the defendant's constitutional right to confront
witnesses against him is violated if the facially incriminating confession
84. Florida and Illinois do not provide residual hearsay exceptions.
85. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) provides, in pertinent part, "a statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance
of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant."
86. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
87. Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1987).
88. Id. at 190.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324-25 n.9 (1985).
[Vol. 48:435
LEE v. ILLINOIS
of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint jury9l trial,
even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the
codefendant. 92 The Supreme Court justified the exception by emphasiz-
ing the substantial risk that juries may not follow the limiting instruc-
tions under these circumstances, the devastating effect that the
incriminations may have on the defendant, and the fact that the credibil-
ity of the incriminations are inevitably suspect.93
With respect to interlocking confessions, if the interlocking nature
of the confessions does not provide adequate "indicia of reliability" to
meet the Confrontation Clause requirements set out in Lee, then applica-
tion of the Bruton doctrine precludes admission of the confession at their
joint trial. This is true even if the jury is instructed not to consider it
against the defendant, and even if the court admits the defendant's own
interlocking confession against him.94  In Parker v. Randolph,95 the
Supreme Court had considered, but was unable to authoritatively
resolve, the question of whether Bruton applies where the defendant's
own interlocking confession is introduced against him.96 The Cruz court
answered that question in the affirmative. 97 In Parker "each of the
91. Because of Bruton's emphasis on the limitations of the jury system, several federal courts
of appeal have held that Bruton was inapplicable to bench trials. See, e.g., Rogers v. McMackin,
884 F.2d 252, 255-257 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1061 (1990); United States ex rel.
Faulisi v. Pinkney, 611 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Castro, 413 F.2d 891, 894-
95 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950 (1970). Rogers, decided subsequent to Lee,
rejected the notion that Lee made Bruton applicable to bench trials, explaining that the question in
Lee "was not whether admission of the co-defendant's confession [at the joint trial] was
constitutional error, but 'whether [substantive use] by the judge upon the codefendant's
confession' " against the defendant constituted constitutional error. 884 F.2d at 257 (citations
omitted). Thus, whereas the Court in Bruton solely considered whether a court may admit
evidence which is not constitutionally admissible against the defendant at the joint trial with a
limiting instruction, the Court in Lee only addressed the issue of whether the evidence possesses
sufficient "guarantees of trustworthiness" to be constitutionally admissible against the defendant.
Id. at 257.
92. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125-26 (1968).
93. [T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant,
that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Not
only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is
inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand and the
jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation
to shift blame onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably
compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be
tested by cross-examination. It was against such threats to a fair trial that the
Confrontation Clause was directed.
Id. at 135-36 (citations omitted).
94. Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987).
95. 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
96. Id. at 72-73; Cruz, 481 U.S. at 188.
97. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193-94.
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
jointly tried defendants had himself confessed, his own confession was
introduced against him, and his confession recited essentially the same
facts as those of his nontestifying codefendants."98 The Parker plurality
interpreted Bruton as holding "that the Confrontation Clause is violated
only when introduction of a codefendant's confession is 'devastating' to
the defendant's case." 99 They further held that when the defendant has
confessed, " '[his] case has already been devastated,' " so the codefend-
ant's case will rarely " 'be of the 'devastating' character referred to in
Bruton.' "I" Therefore, "the plurality would have held Bruton inappli-
cable to cases involving interlocking confessions." 10' The four remain-
ing justices in Parker disagreed, "subscribing to the view expressed by
Justice Blackmun that introduction of the defendant's own interlocking
confession might, in some cases, render the violation of the Confronta-
tion Clause harmless, but could not cause introduction of the nontestify-
ing codefendant's confession not to constitute a violation."' 10 2
The Cruz Court adopted the approach espoused by Blackmun,
thereby affirming the notion that Bruton is applicable to interlocking
confessions. 10 3 The Court first noted that although "devastating" practi-
cal effect was one of the factors that Bruton considered in assessing
whether the Confrontation Clause might require an exception from the
general rule that jury instructions are sufficient to exclude improper tes-
timony, it did not suggest that the existence of such an effect should be
assessed on a case-by-case basis. 4 Instead, the Court interpreted that
factor as one of the justifications for excepting from the general rule the
entire category of codefendant confessions that implicate the defend-
ants.05 The Court held that there is no reason to exclude as generally
not "devastating" codefendant confessions that "interlock" with the
defendant's own confession.' 0 6
The court went even further by explaining that it is the very "inter-
locking" nature of the codefendant's confession that makes it devastat-
ing to the defendant because ordinarily the defendant attempts to avoid
his confession on the basis that it was not accurately reported or that it
was not really true when made.' 7 Therefore, the codefendant's state-
ment will be extremely damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects,
98. Id. at 190-91; Parker, 442 U.S. at 66-68.
99. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 191.
100. Id. (quoting Parker, 442 U.S. at 73, 75 n.7).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 191-92.
107. Id. at 192.
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the defendant's alleged confession. Thus, the Cruz Court repudiated the
interlocking confessions exception to Bruton.108
The Supreme Court subsequently held in Richardson v. Marsh"°
that in order to avoid the Bruton result of prohibiting admission of a
codefendant's confession, trial courts must either grant a severance
before trial or redact" t0 the codefendant's written statements that are
published to the jury to eliminate any reference to the defendant's exist-
ence."'t The Supreme Court has yet to express an opinion concerning
whether a confession is adequately redacted if the defendant's name is
replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun."t2 A court does not encoun-
ter a Bruton problem by admitting a redacted confession while providing
a limiting instruction to the jury,' 3 even if the confession becomes
incriminating when linked with evidence introduced later at trial. In
Richardson, the Court concluded that the instructions were insufficient
to protect the other defendants only if the confession was incriminating
on its face." 4  Many circuit courts of appeals rely on this requirement
that the confession must be incriminating on its face before mandating
its exclusion in order to admit confessions which do utilize neutral pro-
nouns, where additional evidence and inference are necessary before a
confession can implicate the defendant." 5
108. Fernandez v. Leonardo, 931 F.2d 214, 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 236 (1991)
(citation omitted).
109. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
110. Oral statements admitted at trial through testimony must also be redacted in order to avoid
the Bruton problem. Illinois v. Lincoln, 510 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 515
N.E.2d 120 (I11. 1987).
111. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211. In Richardson, "the confession [was] redacted to eliminate
not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence." Id. (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 211 n.5.
113. Id. at 211. The Court reasoned that "[wihere the necessity of such linkage is involved,
[the] generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction" is less valid than where the
confession is incriminating on its face. Id. at 208. The Court stated that the overwhelming
probability that jurors will be unable to obey the instructions is the foundation of the ruling in
Bruton that limiting instructions were not an adequate substitute for the defendant's constitutional
right of cross-examination. Thus limiting instructions are an adequate substitute when used with a
redacted confession. Id. at 208.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Chrismon, 965 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (7th Cir. 1992) (admission
of statement including references to "we" or "they" did not directly implicate the defendant did
not violate Bruton); United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438, 444 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1600 (1992) ("two or three references to 'everyone' and 'they' ... " did not violate
Bruton); United States v. Strickland, 935 F.2d 822, 826 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 324
(1991) ("the replacement of defendants' names with references such as 'another person,'
combined with an instruction to consider the confession against only the declarant, satisfies
Bruton"); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1502 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 498 U.S. 863
(1990) (admission of a confession including a reference to a collective ("we") and thus only
incriminating to a member of the group when linked with other evidence does not violate Bruton).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Before admitting a codefendant's confession as substantive evi-
dence against a defendant that it inculpates, it is crucial for a court to
interpret Lee v. Illinois as requiring both that the confession qualify as a
hearsay exception under the applicable hearsay rules and that it satisfy
the reliability requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Although the
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause serve similar purposes, their
requirements may not be the same in the context of admitting a code-
fendant's confession into evidence. In order to satisfy the intent of the
Congress of the United States as well as state legislatures in promulgat-
ing their respective evidence codes, a court must not rely solely on the
Constitutional requirements mandated in the Confrontation Clause.
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